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Abstract 
The aircraft power plant becomes even harder since the complexity and integrity of system function, and the 
traditional system safety analysis, influenced by the personal skills and experience of analysis, may cause error and 
system failure condition and effects. The paper presents a new approach called Model-based Safety Analysis (MBSA) 
for complex system, and the process of MBSA is studied by linking function modeling using formal language and 
fault propagation based on Altarica, and the given method can be introduced to aircraft power plant system in order to 
unify the process the system development and system safety assessment, and versatility and feasibility of the 
approach are demonstrated with the case study of aircraft power plant. 
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1. Introduction 
The power plant system is the heart of aircraft, which is complex and critical system. Due to technical 
difficulty as well as dynamic loading and environment, the safety assessment of power plant system is 
becoming challenge. 
The regulations associated with system safety show it is of importance to unify the process between 
system design and safety analysis, making it more efficient to ensure that the systems meet their safety 
requirements during safety design, analysis and assessment for complex system. For instance, the 
regulation of SAE ARP4754A requires comprehensive analysis stem from different system model[1], on 
the one hand safety requirements are obtained through safety assessment, and on the other hand the safety 
requirements should be transmitted to system engineering in order to reduce and control risk through a 
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deductive and iterative approach.  Therefore, in order to steer automated integration process by a study of 
system safety analysis, it is capital to combine system process and safety assessment. 
Since different functions of power plant system becomes high relevant and coupling, traditional 
process of  safety assessment (e.g. FMEA FTA) relying on manual iteration used by safety engineering is 
lower efficient, and any change associated system design would make the classical safety analysis of 
complex system increasingly more difficult to complete, so the analysis of safety critical systems 
confronts with a situation in which, on the one hand complexity of systems causes a shift towards 
integration, while on the other hand safety concerns push for a re-thinking of the presently established 
safety assessment processes. 
According the difficulties of system safety analysis proposed in the paper, the presented approach is 
MBSA [2-3], which makes contributions to automate safety analysis and conquers the drawback of 
traditional safety analysis, in addition objectives of MBSA can support continuous safety iteration during 
the whole process of design phase. MBSA has been applied to Dassault and Airbus 380, which reflects 
possible hazard origins during the system design phase, so the method can developed to reduce and 
control potential hazard used an integrity safety model for enhance the safety level of complex system. 
Significant works addressed the studies, the reference [4] proposes an integrated safety prognosis model 
considering the randomness, complexity and uncertainty of fault propagation, and the reference [5] 
proposes a method which can automatically identify the combinations of failures from FMEA results 
report, making it practical for system designer and safety engineering to study and act on the results. 
Therefore, the paper proposes a new approach called MBSA for complex system, and the proposed 
method can unify the process between system design and safety assessment, and complete the automated 
iteration process of system safety analysis during the whole life. The given method is applied to a real 
system to access the safety state of aircraft power plant system, which identifies the hazard and controls 
the risk. 
Nomenclature 
FMEA Failure mode and effect analysis 
MBSA Model-based safety analysis 
FHA    Function Hazard Analysis 
FTA    Fault Tree Analysis 
AADL Architecture Analysis & Design Language 
DBD   Dysfunctional Behavior Data 
PSSA Preliminary System Safety Assessment  
SSA   System Safety Assessment 
2. The technique of safety analysis based on model 
2.1. Process overview of Model-Based safety Assessment 
The safety assessment proposed SAE ARP4754A for V process requires to involve aircraft, system 
and equipments level, and the whole work should be completed manually, however the efficiency is lower 
with the system lager and complexity, so it should improve the traditional process of safety assessment 
aiming at automated safety integration, and the improve V process is show as Fig 1. 
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Altarica supports the automated modelling and analysis of system safety based on functional model, 
and it allows representing the failure propagation. The language is carried out by the tool 
CeciliaTMOCAS and SimFia of Dassault and APSYS respectively which provides a graphical interface 
to design models and allow analyzing them by different ways such as simulation, automatic generation of 
minimal cuts or sequences. An Altarica model is a network of interconnected components so called 
"node" which is atomic or composed of interconnected sub-nodes, and each node has a finite number of 
[8]:  
1) Flow variables. They are the inputs and outputs of the node used to link the node and its 
environment (other nodes). 
2) State variables. These internal variables memorizes current or previous functioning mode (e.g. 
failure mode).In the formal modelling with Altarica, these variables (flow and state) belong to finite 
domains of values (Boolean or enumerated). 
3) Events. They label changes of value of state variables. They model the occurrences of fault, human 
actions or a reaction to a change of one input value. 
The node dynamic is defined by: 
1) Initiation. This is used to assign initial value to state variables. 
2) Transitions. The described how the state variables are modified and they have the following format: 
G(s,v) |-E->s_ 
Where G(s, v) is a Boolean condition on the state variables s and input variables v, E is the event and 
s_is the effect of transition on the state variables. If condition G is true, then the event E can be trigged 
and state variable are modified as described in s_. 
2.3. Automated safety synthesis 
To enable model-based safety assessment, the fault model which is described by formal language is 
composed with the nominal system model to describe the behavior of the system in the presence of fault 
scenario. We call this the Extended System Model (similar to the FSAP/NuSMV-SA documentation). 
There are two approaches to adding fault information to the system model. First, it is possible to embed 
the fault behavior directly into the system model. The second option is to develop the fault model as a 
separate entity from the system model and automatically merge these two models for analysis. We will 
investigate both these approaches later in the report. 
Once we have the extended system model, the safety analysis involves verifying whether safety 
requirements hold in the presence of the faults defined in the fault model. The safety or system engineer 
can perform exploratory analysis by simulating faults on specific components and observing the behavior 
of the system. For more rigorous analyses, it is possible to use formal verification tools to determine 
whether safety properties of interest hold. 
3. Application 
3.1. Illustration of Power plant Functions 
The approach proposed in the paper is applied to power plant system, and overview is given in Fig.2 
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Fig.2 The overview of model-based safety assessment for power plant system
The power plant system is composed of engine, nacelle and power plant components in airframe, and
the main function is as follows:
1) Providing the normal thrust for aircraft;
2) Providing the reverse thrust for aircraft;
3) Providing the information of engines parameters;
4) Providing crew alerting information of engines;
5) Providing the power resource for variable frequency generator;
6) Providing bleed for environment control system;
7) Providing uncontained rotor protection of engines.
3.2. Power plant system FHA
According the outputs of power plant FHA, safety requirements of power plant system are given in 
Table1(Partial):
Table 1. Safety requirements of power plant system(Partial)
Reference Failure Condition Safety Objective Flight Phase
71-F1-02 Uncontrolled high thrust <5e-10 T, F4, L,T
71-F1-05 Unprotected overspeed <1e-9 F1-F4, L
71-F1-06 Loss of normal thrust for two engines <1e-9 T(V>V1), GA
71-F1-07 Loss of thrust control for two engines <1e-9 T(V>V1), F1-F4, L
71-F1-09 Thrust Loss of one engine and N1 too slow on theother engine <1e-9 T(V>V1), F1-F4,L
71-F2-09 Uncommented open of one thrust reverser <3e-10 T, F1-F4, L
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3.3. Formal modeling of power plant system
The system dysfunctional behavior is modelling based on formal language Altarica, and the formal
model of uncontrolled high thrust is illustrated in Fig.3.
Fig.3. Formal model of uncontrolled high thrust
3.4. Automated FTA generation
According the formal model of power plant with Altarica data flow based on risk engineering, then 
fault propagation can be modelled, finally the FTA is generated autonomically. In this paper, d the FTA 
result is shown in Fig.4.
91 Yan Li et al. /  Procedia Engineering  80 ( 2014 )  85 – 92 
Uncontroled_High_Thrus
t_happened
Left_Engine_Uncontr
olled_Thrust_happed
Right_Engine_Uncontrol
led_Thrust_happed
Left_Engine_High_
Thrust
Uncontrolled_High_
Thrust
EEC_FMV_Loc
ation_Error
Fuel_Provide_Hig
h_Fuel
FADEC_A_
Loss_FMV_l
ocation
FADEC_B_
Loss_FMV_l
ocation
FMV failed Flow_Signal_Error
EEC_Overspeed_P
rotection_FailureEICAS No
Indicaion:N
1/N2
FADEC_A_
Failure
FADEC_B_
Failure
HPSOV_Un
able_Closed
1
1
Fig.4. FTA generation of uncontrolled high thrust
The process of safety design, analysis and assessment is performed automatically in the unified formal
model through the application of power plant system, and the potential hazards are identified, and the
method proposed in the paper can developed to reduce and control possible hazard origins, enhancing the
safety level of power plant system, therefore illustration of power plant system demonstrates the 
applicability and versatility of the proposed approach.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank COMAC (Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China) for funding this work,
in particular Ning Cui and Zongbao Guo for their useful comments and for supporting development of 
ideas in this paper.
92   Yan Li et al. /  Procedia Engineering  80 ( 2014 )  85 – 92 
References 
[1] SAE ARP 4754 A.Guidelines for development of civil aircraft systems.2010,REV.A. 
[2] M.Bozzano,A.Villafiorita. Improving system reliability via model checking˖the  fasp/nusmv-sa safety analysis platform. In 
Proceedings of SAFECOMP 2003,p.  49-62. 
[3] M.Bozzano. An integrated methodology for design and safety analysis of complex system In Proceedings of ESREL 
2003:237-245, Balkema Publishers. 
[4] Jinqiu Hu, Laibin Zhang, Lin Ma.An integrated safety prognosis model for complex system based on dynamic Bayesian 
network and ant colony  algorithm .Expert System with Applications,2011,38(2):1431-1446. 
[5] C.J.Priceˈ N.S.Taylor. Automated multiple failure FMEA .Reliability Engineering and System Safety,2002, 76(1) : 1-10. 
[6] AC25.1309. System Design and Analysis .Advisory Circular,2002. 
[7] Pierre David,Vincent Idasiak.Reliability study of complex physical systems using SysML .Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety,2010, 95(5): 431-450. 
[8] Boiteau M,Dutuit Y,Rauzy A, Signoret J-P. The AltaRica data-flow languages in use:modeling of production availability of 
a multi-state system .Reliability Engineering and System Safety,2006, 91(8):747-755. 
 
